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Many letters were sent between President Rhee Syng-Man and President Dwight Eisenhower 
before and after the release of anti-communist POWs which was unilaterally ordered by Rhee. 
According to these letters, President Rhee intended to use the release as a means to disturb the 
armistice and Ike was furious to the point of devising another plan to replace leadership in South 
Korea. According to the letters, the conflict between the two leaders was much more serious than it had 
been already assessed by scholars.  
Furthermore, Rhee's “March North for Unification” was another controversial issue after the 
armistice. It was closely related to the political conference which was a critical provision of the 
Armistice Agreement. The conference was to be held three months after the armistice was signed. Rhee 
refused to attend the conference and wished to implement his policy in case the conference failed, 
whereas the US government strongly opposed any military reaction against the communists. The 
controversy continued until the end of the Rhee administration.  
What caused these serious conflicts at the critical moment between two countries that in the end 
signed a mutual security pact? According to the letters, the cause mainly stemmed from Rhee's hawkish 
policy which rejected any peaceful solution of the Korean problem. However, this is a reflection of 
Rhee’s disappointment not only at the change in the war policy of the UN and the US, but also at the 
vague comments by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles about Rhee’s request. 
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2013 is the sixtieth anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, which was signed after the 
end of hostilities in the Korean peninsula. During the sixty years following 1953, the security 
system of the Korean peninsula was managed under the Armistice System established by the 
Armistice Agreement. Many scholars have pointed out that the signing of the Armistice 
Agreement did not mean that the war ended, as thousands of clashes and skirmishes still 
occurred under the system (Criebel, 1972, 96-99; Lerner, 2002; Myung Rim Park, 1996; Tae 
Gyun Park, 2006). Although the DPRK government has tried to argue that the agreement is 
null and void since 1994, all other parties in the Armistice System—South Korea, the United 
States, and China—recognize that it is still in operation until the “final peaceful settlement is 
achieved” based on the protocol in the preamble of the Armistice Agreement.1 
In this sense, there remains a question: why has North Korea maintained that the 
                                                          
1  Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and the Supreme 
Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, 
Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea. Signed at Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953. International 
Organization, vol. 7, No. 4, Nov. pp. 612-634 
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Armistice Agreement no longer functions since 1993? The general answer can be easily 
imagined from two perspectives. On one hand, North Korea wants to have direct talks with 
the US without the participation of South Korea; on the other hand, this bilateral talk will 
have the effect of isolating South Korea. The legitimacy for this action is provided by the 
fact that the South Korean government did not sign the agreement in 1953, even though 
operational control over the South Korean forces was under the United Nations Forces 
command.2 
It is clear that both the South Korean president and the UN Forces commander did not 
sign in 1953. President Syngman Rhee did not agree to end the hostilities and insisted on the 
continuation of the war against both North Korean and Chinese forces despite the US 
government’s attempt to persuade him to sign the agreement. Why didn't he? What was his 
motivation for rejection even when it was highly likely that South Korea would be unable to 
defend itself without American assistance during and after the war? Did President Rhee 
really want to reach the Yalu River and oust all communists from the Korean peninsula 
against President Eisenhower’s strong opposition? If so, was his plan realistic? 
No scholar is yet to provide clear answers to these questions. Not only because of the 
lack of raw data, but also because it can be easily guessed that Rhee's plan was just rhetoric 
to acquire security guarantee from the US at the time. Accordingly, the release of anti-
communist prisoners of war on Rhee’s order in 1953 is interpreted as a successful 
brinkmanship strategy to engage the US government to sign the Mutual Defense Treaty with 
South Korea at that time (Il Young Kim, 2004, 103-105)3. 
I would like to reexamine this argument by assessing the letters exchanged between Rhee 
and Ike in 1953 and 1954, which have been recently declassified by the Presidential Archive 
in South Korea.4 During this time, Rhee and Secretary of State John F. Dulles exchanged 
numerous letters with each other as well, which are also examined in this paper. These letters 
allow a much deeper analysis of the characteristics and the reality of the event. 
 
1.1 Different Prerequisite for the Armistice  
 
In Rhee’s letter to Ike on April 9, 1953, he expressed his intention to continue to march 
north until unification was reached, regardless of the US force’s support. In a very strong 
tone, he wrote, “The United States forces should decide to withdraw entirely from Korea, … 
if the US did not want to provide coverage with planes, long-range artillery and naval 
vessels.” (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 33) 
This was a bombshell to Ike who had urged North Korean and Chinese communist forces 
to agree with the cease-fire of the war, which was also one of the crucial commitments made 
by Ike during the 1952 presidential campaign. The visit to Korea as the President-elect 
between December 2 and 5, 1952 demonstrated the urgency of the cease-fire in the new 
administration, which was inaugurated in early 1953.5 A truce at the front-line was the 
                                                          
2  Han, Eungho, “Chŏngjŏn hyŏpjŏng wibanja ŭi hwangdanghan kwebyŏn” [Absurd rhetoric by 
violators of the Armistice Agreement], Rodong sinmun, April 6, 1991. 
3  Although Rosemary Foot paid attention to the US policy toward the Armistice negotiation and 
agreement, she did not focus on the circumstances Rhee was in. (Foot, 1990) 
4 The letters were transferred from the Kyŏngmudae, where the South Korean president lived in 1950s, 
to the archive. 
5 “Sasangch’oyuŭi Kwibin” [The Unprecedented VIP], December 7, 1953. Dong-A Daily. 




foremost priority for the US government at the time, to the point where Ike seriously 
considered intimidating the communists with an atomic bomb in order to reach a 
compromise. What struck the American government by surprise was that the South Korean 
government, an ally that had barely maintained sovereignty by the US-led UN Force’s 
assistance after North Korea’s invasion, did not abide by Ike’s policy. 
The letter sent by the American president on April 23 shows his severe grief. In his most 
courteous words, Ike wrote, “I would be lacking in candor if I did not state that I was deeply 
disturbed at the implication of your letter of April 9, not only for Korea but for the efforts 
being made to deal with the problem of Communist aggression by the collective action of 
free peoples.” He added that his effort to stop the hostility within the Korean peninsula might 
be entirely compromised “if your Government should take actions which could not be 
supported by this or other governments supporting the defense of your country.” Then he 
warned as below;  
 
You recognize that any such action by your government could only result in disaster for 
your country, obliterating all that has been gained at such sacrifices by our peoples. I am 
confident that if a spirit of mutual respect, trust and confidence as essential to the 
accomplishment of the high task upon which our countries are engaged can be maintained, we 
shall be successful. However, if unhappily the objective of a true peace proves to be 
unattainable, sober consideration will then have to be given as to what should be done under 
those circumstances. 
 
The last sentence of this letter, “sober consideration will then have to be given as to what 
should be done under those circumstances,” deserves particular attention. This signifies the 
gravity of Rhee’s statement and Ike’s response. Although he did not directly mention it, his 
words implied that Rhee’s plan could seriously undermine Ike's effort to end the hostilities. 
Eisenhower may have regarded Rhee’s plan as a direct challenge to the US (The Presidential 
Archives, 2012: 38-39). 
Rhee seems to have been perplexed by Ike’s letter. Although he reiterated his position 
against the armistice, he had begun to suggest conditions to accept the US policy for the 
cease-fire in his letter on May 30, 1953. First of all, he wrote that it is absolutely intolerable 
to allow “the Chinese Communists to remain in Korea,” as it would entail “an acceptance of 
a death sentence without protest” for South Korea. He used the word “stalemate” in his letter 
to describe South Korea’s situation because the Chinese Voluntary Army (CVA) was 
involved in the Korean War.  
Secondly, the more important condition he proposed was the agreement of a mutual 
defense pact between Korea and the US before the armistice is working. He added it would 
be more appropriate if the pact is signed on the condition that both the Communist and the 
US forces withdraw from Korea simultaneously. This opened the possibility that the US 
forces may leave Korea if the unilateral military action to North Korea was supported by the 
mutual defense pact.  
However, the pact should cover the following points according to Rhee: 
 
The United States will agree to come to our military aid and assistance immediately without 
any consultation or conference with any nation or nations, if and when an enemy nation or 
nations resume aggressive activities against the Korean peninsula. Adequate supplies of arms, 
ammunition and general logistic materials will be given to Korea with a view to making it 
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strong enough to defend itself without needing American soldiers to fight in Korea again. The 
United States air and naval forces will remain where they are now so as to deter the enemy 
from attempting another aggression. (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 46-48) 
 
Rhee’s desire to sign this pact was so strong that he wanted to sign it even before the 
armistice was concluded.  
In fact, the points Rhee suggested above have a very important meaning in modern 
Korean history. Not only Rhee, but other South Korean presidents, in particular Park 
Chŏnghee, also wanted the US to guarantee their immediate or automatic involvement 
without any consultation or conference, if and when an enemy nation resumes aggressive 
activities against South Korea. That was one of the foremost conditions that Park requested 
the Johnson administration when he decided to send Korean combat troops to Vietnam (Tae 
Gyun Park, 2013: 270-317).  
And the last point, “The United States air and naval forces will remain where they are 
now so as to deter the enemy from attempting another aggression,” deserves attention as well. 
At the beginning of the letter, it sounded as though Rhee accepted the US forces’ concurrent 
withdrawal with the CVA. However, this point suggests otherwise: while stressing “the right 
of self-determination” at the end of the letter, the last point emphasizes the need for the US 
force presence in South Korea. 
From Ike’s point of view, Rhee's proposal was acceptable since he had already 
considered forming a security pact with South Korea, similar to the ones already concluded 
with Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. In his letter dated June 6, 1953, 12 days before 
the release of the anti-communist POWs, he was willing to sign the treaty at the extension of 
Rhee’s agreement on the armistice agreement.6 Ike even mentioned the possible creation of a 
“collective security system,” although the US government had been reluctant to establish one 
in the Pacific area that differed from NATO in Europe and SEATO in Southeast Asia. Rhee 
had earnestly called for the collective security system since his inauguration in 1948.7 
However, he expressed the difficulty in accepting the conditions Rhee suggested. First of 
all, Ike wrote, “[o]f course you realize that under our constitutional system any such treaty 
would be made only with the advice and consent of the Senate,” which meant that Rhee's 
first prerequisite condition, “without any consultation or conference with any nation or 
nations,” could not be fulfilled. Furthermore, simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops 
from the Korean peninsula was simply impossible from Ike’s perspective (The Presidential 
Archives, 2012: 54-57). 
In the end, the letter from Ike on June 6, 1953 shows that he did not accept most of the 
main conditions that President Rhee proposed as prerequisites for a mutual defense pact 
through correspondence. A week later on June 13, President Ike invited President Rhee to 
Washington D.C. to consult the issue confidentially through a letter sent by the Secretary of 
State, John Foster Dulles (The Presidential Archives, 2012, 176-178). 
The letters between early 1953 and the period shortly before the release demonstrate that 
                                                          
6 In the letter of June 6, 1953, there is a mistyping, “investiment [investment].” And another error is 
also found; “andintentions notto [and intentions not to].” 
7 Since the beginning of the Republic of Korea (ROK) government in 1948, President Rhee expressed 
his willingness to organize a collective security pact in the Asia-Pacific region. According to him, 
South Korea should initiate the pact along with Taiwan, both of which were located in front-lines of 
the Cold War system (Choe, 1999; J. Park, 2006; T. Park, 2009). 




neither of them made any concessions and realized that a compromise through peaceful 
means, such as a cease-fire, would not be possible, at least from Rhee’s side.  
 
1.2 A Temporary Remedy  
 
On June 17, 1953, one day before the release of anti-communist POWs, Rhee sent a letter 
which seemed to be a declaration of provocation. In the first part of the letter, he expresses 
the despair of inevitable recognition that he could not change the imminent situation. The 
UN is willing to “conclude a ceasefire agreement with the communist aggressors, regardless 
of what may happen to Korea in practical terms,” which caused South Koreans to be 
“constantly haunted by the question of how we can survive as a nation at all.” He follows 
with complaints about the changes in the United States’ war strategy since 1950. 
 
In the first year of this three-year war, both the United States and the United Nations 
alternately and repeatedly announced as their war objectives, the establishment of a united, 
independent and democratic Korea and the punishment of the aggressors. These 
announcements were proclaimed at the time of the United Nations’ drive to the Yalu, thus were 
considered by South Koreans as declared war objectives. But later when the communist forces 
proved to be stronger than expected, the United Nations forces leaders argued that it had never 
intended to unify Korea through war. That was an open confession of weakness; very few 
people took it at its face value. There is no longer the talk about “the unification of Korea” or 
“punishment of the communist aggressors,” as if these objectives are already achieved or 
abandoned them entirely. All we hear about is the armistice. I have a deep suspicion whether an 
armistice reached in such an atmosphere of appeasement can lead to a permanent peace that is 
acceptable and honorable. Personally I do not believe that the communists will agree to, at a 
conference table, what they have never agreed on the battle field. 
 
Rhee then asserted that he was willing to refuse the US assistance “as a price for our 
acceptance of the armistice,” because the armistice would be a “fatal blow” to South Korea. 
According to him, even the effect of the mutual defense pact would be questionable and 
“diminished almost to a vanishing point.” He interpreted the truce talk between the UN and 
communists as “joining hands, it seems, with the enemy.” 
In the last paragraph of the letter, he brought up three questions: “What is to follow for 
the rest of Far East? And the rest of Asia? And the rest of the Free World?” Rhee ended his 
letter to Ike with these words: “Still looking to your wise leadership for a remedy in this 
perilous hour.” The last words imply that Eisenhower is expected to replace his mistaken 
policy to a wise one by initiating an action (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 62-63). 
A day after sending the letter to Ike, Rhee suddenly ordered the South Korean military 
police to release the anti-communist POWs from POW camps on June 18, 1953, without any 
notice to the UN forces command who held the operational control over the entire South 
Korean forces. The date, June 18, 1953, was the day when three parties, North Korean 
Forces, the CVA and the UN forces command planned to sign the Armistice Agreement. It 
was clear that Rhee’s decision fell on that day in order to interrupt its conclusion, as he knew 
the communists would not sign the agreement upon UN forces’ violation of the concord. The 
concord between them was that Indian forces as a neutral power would manage all of anti-
communist POWs who refused to return, soon after the signing of armistice agreement in the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) (Stairs, 1970: 302-320). 
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Ike was furious at the release ordered by Rhee. He strongly criticized Rhee's action in the 
letter dated in June 19, 1953, one day after the release.8 Eisenhower denounced the release 
ordered by Rhee as an “open violence” by “South Korean elements against the authority of 
the United Nations Command,” because the POWs camp was “under the authority of the 
United Nations command.”9 Furthermore, he discussed President Rhee’s letter on July 15, 
1950 as below: 
 
On July 15, 1950, you formally advised the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations 
Command that in view of the joint military effort of the United Nations on behalf of the 
Republic of Korea you assigned to him and to such military commanders as may exercise 
United Nations Command authority within Korea or in adjacent seas “authority over all land, 
sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the present state of hostilities.” 
I am informed by General Clark and assurance that you would take no unilateral action at 
variance with the forging without prior consultation with them.  
Your present order and action there under constitutes a clear violation of this assurance and 
creates an impossible situation for the United Nations Command. If continued, such a course of 
action can only result in the needless sacrifice of all that has been won for Korea by the blood 
and bravery of its magnificent fighting forces. Persistence in your present course of action will 
make impractical for the United Nations Command to continue to operate jointly with you 
under the conditions which would result there from.  
 
Ike then stressed that “another arrangement” would be necessary, “[u]nless you are prepared 
immediately and unequivocally to accept the authority of the United Nations Command.”10 
He added that the UN Commander-in-Chief has now been authorized to take such steps if it 
may become necessary, although there is no mention of what “such steps” were (The 
Presidential Archives, 2012: 66-67). 
“Another arrangement” and “such steps” in the letter may refer to rendering Rhee 
powerless and incompetent or forcing him not to obstruct President Ike’s plan for the 
armistice. Another hypothetical plan would be the removal of UN forces from the Korean 
peninsula, but this was not strategically viable because it would denote the failure of US 
policies since 1945 as well as during last three years. In fact, as it has been well researched in 
the academia, this “Ever-ready Plan” to depose Rhee from presidency may have been one of 
                                                          
8 Not only President Ike, but Secretary of State Dulles also seemed to express his despair to President 
Rhee by a letter. Although his letter is not found in the files of President Rhee’s letters, it is not 
difficult to imagine the contents through a letter sent from President Rhee to the secretary dated on 
July 11, 1953. In the letter, President Rhee wrote that he was so frustrated by a letter from Secretary 
Dulles. The paragraph of the letter is as below; “As I reread your letter, and I assure you it has had my 
most earnest and prayerful attention, its text seems to indicate that I am a heartless wretch without 
gratitude and without any regard for any human values except perhaps the narrow self-interest of our 
own people. I cannot think that this is a true representation of your feelings. It is true, of course, that 
we have asked and asked, and that we have received and received.” (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 
176-178) 
9 This was reported in Dong-A Daily on June 20, 1953, entitled, “Aekukporo Sŏkbang Banhyang [The 
Reaction of the release of the Patriotic POWs],” However, this was not yet cited by any scholars.  
10 In addition, he was willing to declare that designated mutual security agreement proposed by his 
letter of June 6, 1953 must not become applicable. 




such schemes (Hong, 1994; T. Park, 2012: 117-122).11 Instead, Ike chose to send a special 
envoy, Assistant Secretary of State Robertson, to coerce Rhee to return operational control 
over South Korean forces to the UN forces command. He arrived in Seoul on June 25, 1953, 
a week after the release.12 
Eisenhower was satisfied with the result of the negotiation between Rhee and Robertson. 
He remarked, “Mr. Robertson’s reports encourage me to believe that we can continue to go 
forward side by side,” and “I hope many misunderstandings have brought about an intimacy 
of understanding and purpose between us which has been too long deferred,” in his letter 
dated in July 8, 1953. He added that he was “profoundly sympathetic” to President Rhee and 
appreciated his concession: “Your illustrious place in history as a great patriot is due to 
patient and sober striving.” (The Presidential Archives, 2012, 69-70) According to this letter, 
all the conflicts between the US and the South Korean government have been resolved. 
However, the reality was different from Washington’s expectations. In a correspondence 
sent to Ike on July 11, 1953, Rhee reiterated his wish for a political settlement in exchange 
for the unification through armistice, in spite of his decision not to obstruct it “in any manner, 
the implementation of the terms, in deference to your requests.” In other words, he had 
agreed with Ike's envoy just to show “an evidence of friendship.” He further cautioned that 
although he wishes the successful execution of Ike’s plan, communists will never dare to 
advance and that “the world will be pushed over the brink of general war.” (The Presidential 
Archives, 2012: 73-74.) 
Rhee then intimated that through his plan of crossing over the demarcation line, 
“Marching North for Unification (pukjint’ongil),” would be consistent with the Eisenhower 
administration’s future plans “following the expected failure of the political conference” as 
designated in the Armistice Agreement. His argument was included in the letter to Secretary 
Dulles, sent on the same day as the aforementioned letter to Ike. Although he inevitably 
accepted what was asked by the US, he expressed to Secretary Dulles that he acceded despite 
his dissent with the objective. Rhee further pressed Dulles that should the armistice result in 
failure, the Eisenhower administration must let him do whatever he wants (The Presidential 
Archives, 2012: 183-188). 
His remarks to both Ike and Dulles are consistent with his public announcement in the 
press conference held soon after the meeting with Assistant Secretary Robertson. He argued 
publicly that the position of a representative in the UN forces at the truce talk was very 
different from the mutual consent between him and Robertson, and he was not yet informed 
about what the Eisenhower administration guaranteed at the expense of his concession. Rhee 
also claimed that he did not receive any feedback on the clauses he wished to be included in 
the mutual defense pact, although Ike had already expressed his rejection of Rhee’s 
suggestions in the letter dated on June 6, 1953, as previously discussed here. His speech in 
public was very different from that in his letters to Ike. As if doing a favor, he ended his 
speech with a comment that he truly hopes to refrain from conducting unilateral policies such 
                                                          
11 According to Hong and T. Park, the plan was already designed during the 1952 political turmoil 
which was a little different from that in 1953. However, it was not implemented in 1952 because the 
American government successfully reached a compromise between President Rhee and the opposition 
party back then. 
12 “Han’gukunmyŏngŭi Chungdaegiro [Crucial Crossroad of Korea’s Destiny],” June 27, 1953. 
Kyunghyang Daily. 
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as the release.13 
Through an analysis of the letters between Ike and Rhee before and after the release of 
anti-communist POWs, it can be inferred that the conflict caused by Rhee’s unilateral action 
were only superficially remedied through letters between them and Robertson’s visit to 
Korea. Their interpretation of the compromise was very different; Ike believed that Rhee 
completely accepted his position and promised not to commit unilateral actions anymore, 
while Rhee seemed to feel that American government did not clearly express what they 
would do for him to agree on the armistice. The key point was also different; for Rhee, it was 
about whether continuous military action for unification is possible if the political conference 
had failed, whereas Ike paid more attention to Rhee’s concession due to a mutual defense 
pact between the US and South Korea. They were two strange bedfellows: the conflict 
between them was not resolved, but had only been remedied temporarily. 
 
1.3 What did Rhee Get?  
 
The Armistice was signed on July 27, 1953 and brought an end to the three-year 
hostilities. It had taken two years to reach an agreement between United Nations and the 
Communist forces. However, it did not only denote that all military clashes permanently 
stopped; the tensions between American and South Korean government were also not 
resolved. The former has been already examined by many scholars, while the same is not 
true for the latter case. 
At the moment of signing, Ike may have been concerned more with the actions President 
Rhee would take than what would happen in Panmunjŏm. However, there had been another 
contention in late July shortly before the armistice. Rhee sent a letter on July 24, 1953 to 
Secretary Dulles and he stressed again the guarantees he wanted from the US in return for his 
agreement with the armistice. At the risk of being redundant with his letter dated on May 30 
aforementioned, Rhee nonetheless clarified the proposed prerequisite conditions to 
Eisenhower again.  
 
First, in the proposed mutual security pact, may we count upon inclusion of a provision for 
immediate and automatic military support in case the Republic of Korea should be attacked by 
an external enemy? As you know, a pact that is sufficient for a nation not in our position would 
not be adequate to our needs.  
Second, when the political conference fails in ninety days, may we count upon the United 
States joining with us to resume the military efforts to drive the Chinese Red invaders from our 
land? If this joint effort to achieve our common objective is beyond your present ability to 
promise us, can we count upon the United States for moral and material support, in addition to 
general economic assistance, for our own military efforts to eject the invaders from Korea? 
(The Presidential Archives, 2012, 190-191) 
 
This letter disconcerted Ike and Dulles. In particular, both of them were surprised that 
President Rhee did not understand what the American government communicated to him 
through letters since June 6 and meetings with Robertson after the release of the anti-
communist POWs. Dulles immediately sent a letter the following day on behalf of President 
                                                          
13 “Hanmihyŏpyak hyujihwarŭl wuryŏ” [Anxiety about the Armistice Being made a scrap of paper], 
July 26, 1953. Kyunghyang Daily. 




Ike. Dulles started with the below sentence: 
 
I have your message of July 24. I have read it to President Eisenhower. We are both 
surprised at your statement that “before deciding on the position of my Government it is of 
utmost importance(sic) to have your answers to two vital questions which at present remain in 
an uncertain status.” Our surprise is twofold. We thought you had decided and we thought you 
had the answers. (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 194-195) 
 
Dulles asserted that “only Congress can declare war” according to the US constitution and 
the fact that South Korea had a mutual defense pact should make them “feel confident that 
the treaty we propose will deter aggression.” He even invoked that possible military effort 
following a collapse of the political conference was “not a matter where the President can 
give any blanket commitment in advance.” Then he addressed the international criticism 
directed toward Rhee, which “ha[d] been slandering you and alleging that such promises as 
you have given the President and me could not be rejected these depended upon.” (The 
Presidential Archives, 2012: 194-195)  
However, in Rhee’s letter in July 26, 1953,14 Rhee wrote that the question of whether the 
US would support his military reaction was “left for consideration in my talks with you.” 
This means that further consultation is needed between American and South Korean 
government as soon as possible following the failure of the political conference. He also 
stressed “immediate and automatic military reaction” by the US if South Korea was 
subjected to unprovoked attack.15 By using quotation marks, he intended to emphasize that 
the United States government stated those words to President Rhee, but they could not be 
found in any letters sent by neither President Ike nor Secretary Dulles before July 26, 1953 
(The Presidential Archives, 2012: 198-199). 
As this dispute was going on, President Rhee sent a letter to Ike on July 27, 1953, the day 
hostilities in the Korean peninsula stopped. Rhee wrote, “Your great generosity in rushing 
through (sic) this last week of the Congressional session an immediate appropriation of two 
hundred million dollars to speed our reconstruction is appreciated from the depths of our 
hearts.” He then defined, “one phase of our problem ends and another begins” with the 
signing of the truce. At the end of the letter, he added sarcastically, “[n]aver(sic) in all my 
life have I hoped so much that my own judgment should prove in the end to be wrong.” (The 
Presidential Archives, 2012: 76). 
It deserves our attention that this letter replaced an earlier letter that was not sent to Ike. 
In the undelivered letter, Rhee's had complained about the management of US assistance to 
South Korea. His dissatisfaction involved two points: first, all assistance including funds was 
completely controlled by the American Economic Coordinator; second, the assistance was 
used not for reconstructions and rehabilitation, but for immediate relief. He followed by 
warning President Ike as below: 
 
Iam (sic) sorry to inform you of the fact that our position is such that we cannot sign the 
agreement unless the two points are cleared. We told Mr. Wood that the Korean government 
                                                          
14 This letter started from the sentence, “Your letter of July 25 is both reassuring and a little bit 
disturbing.” 
15 He pointed out that the external attack meant not only from communists but from Japanese in the 
letter. 
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will continue to make every effort to spend a large sum of its own money for the reconstruction 
work - If necessary I will make a record what we have been doing for national reconstruction 
without our side help anybody’s knowing and we pledge to continue to do it in every way 
possible.... 
 
Out of our deep gratitude to your excellency and to your government and the people of the 
United States we would sign any agreement or contract relating to the disposition of the fund 
and I do confess that we did sign every agreement proposed by the representatives of the 
Am[erican] government without raising a question and without knowing the meaning of this 
and that but we have found out that such a way of signing of an international agreement without 
knowing what we are signing for led us to no end of trouble. 
 
His complaint was about a new agreement, “Combined Economic Board (CEB) Agreement 
for a Program of Economic Reconstruction and Financial Stabilization between the Republic 
of Korea and the United States of America” signed on December 14, 1953.16 Did this new 
dispute over the American economic assistance mean a “new phase” (The Presidential 
Archives, 2012: 80-83) from the viewpoint of President Rhee? Rhee said that he could not 
sign the agreement unless the two points which he raised were cleared. This may be one of 
Rhee's strategies in regards to America's economic assistance. Although this letter was not 
delivered to the American government, it reveals that Rhee continued his policy to unify 
Korea by military means. In this sense, a new phase did not come yet, even though the 
Armistice Agreement was signed.  
In the end, Rhee could not get anything from his brinkmanship strategy. What he wanted 
was to continue until all communists were kicked out of the peninsula, or to sign the mutual 
defense pact before the armistice if the Eisenhower administration did not change its policy 
for cease fire. However, neither was achieved at the time of the armistice. Instead, a 
sentiment of distrust began to develop between South Korean and American leaders.  
This led Dulles to send a letter on August 7, 1953, 10 days after the armistice was signed. 
He sent a strong warning to President Rhee: 
 
There are no other agreements or understandings, stated or implied, resulting from these 
consultations, other than these herein contained.  
If either nation, for whatever reason should abrogate or violate any of the agreements 
included in this statement, the other will thereupon be freed from the obligations which it has 
undertaken to maintain these agreements.  
 
He further stated that the South Korean government had agreed to postpone any unilateral 
action regarding expulsion of the CVA from Korea for the agreed duration of the political 
conference (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 203-205). 
This letter is very significant since this letter was sent during his visit to Korea.17 He 
visited Korea on August 4, 1953, in order to consult about the Mutual Defense Treaty and 
                                                          
16 The agreement was also generally called as “Paek-Wood Agreement” because this agreement was 
signed between Paek Dujin, Prime Minister of South Korea and Tyler Wood, an American EC at that 
time. 
17 “Tŏljangkwan ilhaeng chakyach’akhan” [The Group led by Secretary Dulles Arrived Korea Last 
Night], August 5, 1953. Dong-A Daily. 




the US assistance, and had initial signature on the treaty before his departure. Why did 
Dulles send a letter while he was meeting Rhee in person? It can be assumed that Dulles 
wanted to produce a document about what he said to Rhee during the meeting. It may be 
because Dulles and Ike had already experienced communication problems with Rhee before 
and after the release of the anti-communist POWs, as it was mentioned above. Ike was 
embarrassed by Rhee’s comments on his interpretation of Ike’s letter and conversation with 
Robertson, so Ike asked Rhee to reread his letters again. Of course, President Rhee also 
suffered the same problem. 
 
1.4 Unfinished Controversy 
 
For the time being, President Rhee did not mention again about the Marching North 
policy. For example in a letter dated September 7, 1953, after Dulles returned, he pointed out 
another matter as below instead:18 
 
Mr. Secretary, you may misunderstand me when I say anything that may appear as a 
criticism against the State Department. It is not aimed at the upper level authorities generally 
but the lower level pro-Japanese and pro-communist groups whose ideas are certainly in the 
last analysis anti-American (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 210-211). 
 
Throughout his presidency, he frequently mentioned the negative role of pro-Japanese and 
pro-communist groups in the US government who were proponents of Japan-centered Asian 
policy (Tae Gyun Park, 2010). 
Ike continued to pay close attention to Rhee's intentions following Dulles’ visit. He sent a 
letter on November 4, 1953 which stressed the difficulty of obtaining ratification of the 
Mutual Defense Treaty in the Senate. In the letter, he argued that he could not assure the 
senators that the treaty would actually promote peace and mutual defense because Rhee 
“might unilaterally touch off a resumption of war in Korea.” Eisenhower seriously cautioned, 
“[i]f you should decide to attack alone, I am convinced that you would expose the ROK 
forces to a disastrous defeat and they might well be permanently destroyed as an effective 
military force.” (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 86-87) 
Ike’s tone in the letter was unprecedentedly very strong. It is quite difficult to imagine 
why he sent the letter employing a strong warning to Rhee, if only the letters between the 
two of them were examined. The latest letter before the November 4 letter was sent on 
September 7, 1953, from Rhee to Dulles. What happened during the two months?  
Remembering the term of the political conference – “within 3 months”– in the Armistice 
Agreement is very useful in understanding why Ike sent such a letter with a strong tone. 
There were various activities in South Korea to urge resumption of attack against 
communists if the term for the political conference passed. When the first US assistance 
goods entered on August 29, 1953 in Busan, Rhee declared in a speech that South Korean 
forces would unilaterally march to North without UN assistance.19 In addition, Rhee stated 
                                                          
18 It was reported in Washington D.C. that there was no agreement without the treaty after his return. 
[Committing to writing of Eisenhower’s Commitment, the Unknown of the Political Conference], 
August 11, 1953. Dong-A Daily. 
19 “T’ongilwihan t’ujaengŭn pulp’ogi” [Never Give Up the Struggle for Unification], August 31, 1953. 
Dong-A Daily. 
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during an interview with the New York Times on September 30, 1953 that he would resume 
a war for independence and unification if the political conference could not achieve a 
successful result in ninety days.20 In this interview, he changed the date South Korea would 
resume the war from three months after the armistice to ninety days after the opening of the 
conference.21 Even in his speech at the ceremony to celebrate the liberation day on August 15, 
1953, he declared that he would not contribute anything for the success of the political 
conference.22 
After the Armistice Agreement, all the letters sent from Ike repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of the political conference in concluding “a final peaceful settlement.” He also 
robustly urged the South Korean government’s cooperation to the conference. However, 
Rhee's reaction was always negative. The US pressured communist forces to agree with the 
political conference after the Armistice Agreement and the political conference was defined 
in the preamble of the agreement. The Eisenhower administration faced a dilemma because 
of its ally; the Rhee administration continued to refuse participation at the conference. All the 
letters exchanged between Rhee, Eisenhower, and Dulles argued over the effectiveness of the 
political conference. Ike may have been greatly distressed at Rhee’s negative reaction to the 
conference. 
One of the reasons for the US Vice President Nixon’s visit to Korea on November 13, 
1953 was to persuade Rhee to send delegates for the conference. Although Nixon was on a 
tight schedule during his world tour, his mission was very clear according to his conversation 
with President Rhee shortly before his departure at Kyŏngmudae. Nixon stressed that he and 
Rhee agreed that “Korea and the US would keep pace together for establishing free, 
independent and unified Korea through the political conference.”23 
However, Rhee’s attitude was different from Nixon’s remarks in the press conference. In 
his letter on November 16, 1953, one day after Nixon’s departure, Rhee wrote as follows: 
 
In reply to Mr. Nixon’s question but to me just before his leaving, I said that if everything 
should go contrary to our expectation and the worse comes to the worst, I would feel compelled 
to take a unilateral action, which I earnestly hope would never happen. I added, however, that I 
would inform you before making any such move. 
 
Rhee added that he wanted Ike to keep their letters confidential because people could think 
that the US tried to bring pressure on him (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 90-91). In Ike’s 
reply in January 2, 1954, he gave a negative answer as a New Year’s gift that he did not 
accept his request (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 95). 
                                                          
20 “Chŏngch’ihoedam kyŏlryŏlsi pukjinppun” [Only One Solution is Marching North if the Political 
Conference is failed], September 30, 1953 Dong-A Daily. 
21 South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pyŏn Youngtae commented in a press conference that 
South Korean forces would not resume a war even after January 27, 1954, 6 months after the 
Armistice Agreement. (“Chŭksi pukjin annŭnda”[Will Not Resume the War Immediately], October, 
31, 1953. Dong-A Daily.) His press conference was held on October 27, 1953, exactly 3 months after 
the agreement. 
22 “Yidaetongryŏng p’alilo kinyŏmsa” [Celebrating Remark by President Rhee], August 17, 1953. 
Dong-A Daily 
23 “Niksŭn mibutongryŏng chakjoihan” [US Vice President Nixon Left Korea Yesterday Morning], 
November 16, 1953. Dong-A Daily. 




In fact, in a memorandum dated on November 16, 1953, between Rhee and Nixon, Rhee's 
different position clearly surfaced. Nixon said that the US government must have assurance 
from the South Korean President not to take any unilateral action and Ike wanted a personal 
assurance from Rhee. Nixon gladly signed up to deliver Rhee's assurance to President Ike 
when he returned (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 90-91). 
However, the policy of Marching North for Unification was clearly revived in a letter to 
Ike on March 11, 1954, 50 days before the political conference would be held in Geneva.  
 
Under this circumstances(sic), I ask you to give your wholehearted support to our supreme 
effort to unify the north and the south and to drive the Chinese Communist troops from Korean 
soil. Our armed forces are eagerly awaiting the signal to push north, and are completely 
confident of victory. We ask from you only moral and material support. United Nations forces 
now in Korea need not actually participate in the battle, if they do not wish to do so. Koreans 
will take sole responsibility for the fighting. But we do need adequate arms, ammunition, and 
other logistics, and air and naval coverage from behind the frontlines. If you grant this request, 
we shall secretly arrange with General Hull a full program of implementation. When I was in 
Taipei, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek agreed to move his army to the mainland at the same 
time, and I know that he will do so. This information must, of course, be kept in strict 
confidence.  
When Vice President Nixon was here, I promised him that I would take no unilateral action 
without first notifying you. I feel that the time now has come for me to give you such 
notification. ... 
 
He also asked Ike to appoint General Van Fleet who was a commander of the 8th US Army 
during the Korean War as an advisor for training South Korean forces.  
Eisenhower, expectedly, opposed Rhee’s plan and expressed that if Rhee carried it out, 
Ike’s orders “to both United States forces and to other United Nations forces would be to 
plan how best to prevent their becoming involved and to assure their security” in his letters 
on March 21 and April 16, 1954. Eisenhower still promised he would seriously consider 
strengthening the South Korean forces and sending General Van Fleet to Korea to persuade 
Rhee to dispatch the South Korean representative to the political conference. He pointed out 
that the conference was a provision South Korean government accepted and South Korea 
would be the only nation that refuses to attend the conference (The Presidential Archives, 
2012: 102-104). 
President Rhee was persuaded to send a representative to attend the political conference 
being held in Geneva in June due to America’s commitment of military assistance. But at the 
same time, he had planned to declare that the armistice was automatically null and void and 
“there would be no more peace talks or negotiations regarding Korea,” as soon as South 
Korea’s Delegation to Geneva, Foreign Minister Pyŏn, returns from Geneva through his 
letter in June 24, 1954 (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 115-117). 
Furthermore, his plan to Marching North for Unification seemed to gradually take shape 
in Rhee’s letter to Dulles on July 1, 1954. The political conference had failed at the moment 
when he revealed his plan to Eisenhower.  
 
In this connection, I have a definite plan to propose and explain confidentially to President 
Eisenhower and you. This plan will, I am sure, enable us to push up to the Yalu River with 
comparatively little sacrifices. This historic boundary line, if properly fortified, will be more 
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easily held against the enemy than any other line to the South. It is quite certain that this 
conclusive but limited action will not provoke a general war. (The Presidential Archives, 2012, 
pp. 251-252) 
 
The letters that discussed the Marching North for Unification policy between Rhee and Ike 
end in July, perhaps because Rhee visited Washington D.C. in late July and signed the 
Minute Agreement in November 1954.24 The Minute Agreement was more important to the 
Eisenhower administration than the Mutual Defense Treaty, since it included two critical 
contents: the article 2 of the agreement defined that South Korean forces are retained under 
the operational control of the UN command while the Command is responsible for the 
defense of the Republic of Korea; in articles 3 and 4, American government promised to 
provide the maintenance of an effective military program. There was another severe dispute 
between the governments during the discussion of the Minute Agreement, which almost 
induced the Eisenhower administration to revive the Ever-ready Plan in 1954 (Hong, 1994). 
Nonetheless, the agreement seemed to satisfy, to an extent, both presidents of South Korea 
and America.25 
Still, Rhee had not given up his unification policy after the Minute Agreement. For 
example, he had a plan to drive communists out from the three strategic areas, which was 
revealed in a letter to Senator Knowland dated on November 20, 1956. Rhee emphasized 
three areas located in south of the 38th parallel which the North occupied after the 
negotiations for the Armistice began: Kaesŏng, the Ongjin Peninsula, and the Han River 
Delta (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 359-360). 
Due to Rhee’s persistence with the plan, one of his old friends, Dr. Robert T. Oliver sent 
an undated letter to him in 1956 and urged him to suspend his policy.  
 
As I conceive of present day sentiments, it would be better to say nothing of “marching 
north” (although being ready - “talking softly but carrying a big stick”). It does seem a good 
time for a whole series of statements beamed to north Korea the world about the “solidarity” of 
the entire Korean people. (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 362)  
 
After the armistice, problems between South Korean and American government were only 
resolved superficially. Thus, the discord between the two continued to exist afterwards and 
the points of their disagreement were even reported in public. President Rhee did not sign the 
armistice in spite of his commitment to the Eisenhower administration that he would not 
hinder the process. Although he sent representative of South Korea to the political 
conference in 1954, he paid more attention to military strategy after the conference failed, 
instead of focusing on reaching a peaceful solution with allied countries under the UN flag. 
                                                          
24 “Yidaetongryŏng chakil pangmidŭngjŏng” [President Rhee Left to America Yesterday], July 26, 
1954. Dong-A Daily. 
25 From the viewpoint of American president, (1) ‘South Korean government should cooperate with the 
US in its efforts to unify’ in the article 1, (2) ‘an effective military program consistent with economic 
stability and within available resources’ in the article 3 and (3) South Korean government should 
‘continue to encourage private ownership of investment projects’ in the article 4, were also what he 
wanted since his inauguration. From the perspective of the Rhee administration, the part of the article, 
“the US government should consult fully with appropriate military representatives of the ROK in the 
implementation of the program” seemed to satisfy Rhee. 




And his policy, “Marching North for Unification,” continued until the late 1950s to the point 
that one of his closest friends recommended to suspend his plan. It was not terminated until 
he was forced out of the Kyŏngmudae by civilians in 1960, regardless of Ike's commitment 
to provide huge amount of military and economic assistance. Such a conflict between South 
Korean and the US governments on policy toward North Korea were extended to subsequent 
administrations until Korea’s democratization, even though the Park administration gave up 





1953 was a year in which a high number of letters were exchanged between Rhee and Ike. 
In particular, many letters were sent between them before and after the release of anti-
communist POWs unilaterally ordered by Rhee. According to the letters, the release was for 
President Rhee to disturb the armistice and Ike was furious to the point of preparing another 
plan to replace leadership in South Korea. The conflict was more serious than it had been 
already considered by scholars, because Ike directly informed Rhee about the plan in his 
letter. It was not persuasion, but intimidation.  
Furthermore, Rhee's “March North for Unification” was another controversial issue after 
the armistice between South Korean and American governments. It was closely related to the 
political conference which was a critical provision of the Armistice Agreement. The 
conference was planned to be held in three months after the armistice was signed; however, 
there was no provision in the Armistice Agreement about what to do if the conference was 
failed. From the viewpoint of Rhee, he refused to attend the conference and wished to 
implement his policy if the conference was failed, whereas the US government strongly 
opposed any military reaction against the communists. The Eisenhower administration could 
not help providing massive military assistance to persuade Rhee to cooperate with the US 
policy, in spite of fact that such large-scale assistance was not consistent with the New Look 
Policy (Gaddis, 1982: 168-196). Rhee’s plan did not seem to be just rhetoric because it was 
extremely detailed. The controversy continued until the end of the Rhee administration.  
What caused these serious conflicts at the critical moment between two countries that 
signed a mutual security pact? According to the letters cited in this article, the cause mainly 
stemmed from Rhee's hawkish policy which rejected any peaceful solution of the Korean 
problem. He did not agree with any proposals from the Eisenhower administration pursuing 
honorable end of fighting. However, this is a reflection of Rhee’s disappointment. He 
complained about the change in the war policy of the UN and the US, shocked at Ike's 
comment, “[n]either the United States nor the United Nations has ever committed itself to 
resort to war to achieve this objective” (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 38-39). 
Furthermore, the vague comments by Secretary Dulles deserve attention to understand 
Rhee’s reaction. He delivered President Ike's message on July 25, 1953, that President Ike 
“does not wish to curtail the liberty of action to take whatever steps may be indicated by the 
conditions then existing” (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 195). He then wrote as below: 
 
If, after the political conference has been in session for 90 days, it seems to us that the 
Communist delegates are not proceeding in good faith, and are using the conference primarily 
as a cover for political propaganda, then we shall be prepared to make a concurrent withdrawal 
from the conference. We will then consult further regarding the attainment of a unified, free 
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and independent Korea, which is the post war goal the United States set itself during World 
War II, which has been accepted by the United Nations as its goal, and which will continue to 
be an object of concern of United States foreign policy. (The Presidential Archives, 2012: 204) 
 
Possibly, these comments by Secretary Dulles may have been misinterpreted by Rhee, even 
though the Eisenhower administration reiterated several times its strong opposition toward 
resumption of military actions against the communists. Since the primary objective of Ike 
and Secretary Dulles was to coerce Rhee to participate in both the armistice and the political 
conference, there is another possibility that they used inexplicit language both inevitably and 
intentionally. As a result, the conflict continued.  
In that sense, to examine what happened sixty years ago is very useful to understand the 
problems between South Korean and American governments, as well as between South and 
North Korea under the Armistice System. The Armistice Agreement was continued because 
the political conference did not create “a final peaceful settlement.” The agreement does not 
have any provision about what to do if the conference fails.  
Moreover, “Marching North for Unification” policy was extended to the next 
administration, especially in 1968, to which the US government tried to impede the policy by 
sending special envoys and using assistance, but they could not become a permanent solution. 
Only the maintenance of operational condition over the South Korean forces by the UN 
forces command (later the US forces command in South Korea) has been the sole means to 
check such attempts. If the documents produced in the 1970s and 1980s are declassified, 
there is another possibility that similar conflicts had been repeated even after 
democratization under the Armistice System. In other words, the critical complications that 
occurred sixty years ago are the origin of problems to this day. 
More importantly, the conflicts in 1953 and 1954 developed a serious distrust between 
the two governments. When President Park Chŏng Hee declared Yusin in 1972, the 
American Ambassador in Seoul, Habib, felt frustrated and recalled experiences during the 
Rhee era. Along with the Marching North for Unification policy, the incident in 1953 
provoked serious discord and doubt between South Korea and America.26 The legacy of the 
tension between two allies in 1953 was greater than expected, even though the war is now 
becoming forgotten among the young generation.  
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